It makes no sense, as Hossein Askari points out:
The Obama administration has little or no comprehension of the mindset of those who are in control behind the scenes in Iran. U.S. officials and their advisers have hardly had any meaningful engagement with them. These street-smart Iranians are nowhere to be seen in public. In their mindset, the United States is weak and wants an agreement with Iran at any cost whereas they, the Iranians, hold all the cards. To them, Europeans, for example the French, are even weaker; Iranian intelligence operatives were laughing when they got the French authorities to release an Iranian who was being held for the murder of a former Iranian prime minister in France! These shadowy Iranians have contempt for weakness. The willy-nilly ratcheting up of sanctions further supports their beliefs of U.S. indecisiveness and weakness. Although Washington has numerous ways to make the sanctions truly “crippling,” it has declined to do so on the premise that the average Iranian may suffer too much. When have realists lost sleep over the sufferings of average Iranians? The Iranian authorities know that they will not be attacked because: a United States that is unwilling to adopt effective sanctions will not take military action against them; U.S. hands are tied in Afghanistan and in Iraq; although Israel is the only real military threat, America is unwilling to give Israel carte blanche because things could go horribly wrong; and Washington has learned the painful lesson of the Iran-Iraq War if nothing else, that is, if Iran is attacked, then Iranians will rally behind the mullahs.
In today’s Iran the plain truth is that the regime is unpopular as never before. The only supporters of the regime are those who receive direct benefits from their association, including: a minority of clerics (since the devout have long divorced themselves from the likes of Khamenei), the Revolutionary Guards, the Baseej, the intelligence services, the families of “martyrs” who receive regular subsidies and businessmen who are directly connected to regime insiders, all told about five million out of a population of 75 million. The average Iranian no longer supports the regime because: their economic condition has become intolerable and they have no hope of improvement; income disparities have grown since the Shah’s reign; Iranian citizens have fewer personal freedoms than under the Shah; dissidents are treated much more harshly than they ever were under the Shah; and many feel ashamed of where Iran finds itself today, especially in comparison to Persian Gulf Arabs who have historically been regarded as inferior but whom Iranians today envy. And importantly, the majority of Iranians have become totally disenchanted by the entire apparatus of their clerical regime. They see how their religion has become perverted and brutal. They see the devout clerics distancing themselves from the political mullahs. There is a forced religiosity in the today’s Iran and far less religious freedom than there was under the Shah. The clerical regime has brought severe costs, such as economic mismanagement, brutality and religious pretensions, and no tangible benefits. Reminiscences about the Shah’s regime are becoming increasingly frequent and nostalgic.
The clerics and their supporters believe that the United States is bent on getting rid of them and that their best hope for long-term survival is the nuclear program, which they cannot abandon.
Realists in America and in Europe know that the real problem is not Iran’s nuclear quest but its regime. An agreement with the mullahs would be not worth the paper it is written on. The regime with nuclear capabilities will be many times worse than it is the regime of today.
[. . .]
The real hope for average Iranians is . . . crippling sanctions (on Iran’s central bank, stiffer U.S. fines on those who circumvent sanctions and measures to initiate a run on the Iranian currency) coupled with a demand that the regime respect human rights and free elections, including free elections for a change in the constitution (demands that would enrage the regime but hearten average Iranians), all in the hope of toppling the clerical regime at the hands of the Iranian people. Why won’t the United States adopt such an approach? For sheer lack of will. It’s that simple. However, the reasons given are two—the average Iranian will suffer “too much” and nothing will succeed in overthrowing the Tehran regime.
These are manufactured reasons. The average Iranian hopes for a better future, but there is no hope as long as the mullahs and the Revolutionary Guards are in charge. Average Iranians cannot cope with the economic pressures of their daily lives. It is my deeply held belief that they would rather suffer a little more if there were a reasonable chance that mass demonstrations might ensue and that the regime might be overthrown. Most rational people anywhere in the world would choose the same rather than suffer for the foreseeable future.
I may disagree with some particulars concerning Askari’s analysis, but he has the essentials right, in my view. Too bad that no one in the Obama Administration appears to be listening to the likes of him.