Let’s go over some of the events of the past two days:
1. There was yet another demonstration of indeterminate size on Tuesday. Yet another indication–if any were needed anymore–that the protesters are in it for the long haul. The regime has to be frustrated that it is not getting rid of the opposition. Apparently, the regime is reduced to name-calling, in order to undercut the power of the protests. Raise your hand if you actually believe that demonstrating for greater liberty constitutes a sedition more pronounced than, say, stealing an election.
2. Perhaps even more worrisome for the regime: It cannot count on the support of the army anymore. I wonder how many more army officers there are who are willing to show the regime just how opposed they are to its actions. I can’t believe that the number stops at a mere 36.
3. Worth noting: While the conventional wisdom would have us believe that American involvement in favor of the protesters would be the worst thing that could happen to the reformist movement, there is a strong case to be made for the proposition that if a country really wants to screw up in the eyes of Iranians, it will openly back the regime.
5. A split amongst the hardliners. This and other such fissures are worth watching, as the hardliners try to form a united front against the reformist movement. It could be that they will have a hard time tolerating each other, let alone trying to put up with the reformists. In any event, a fight between Ahmadinejad and Khamene’i will have reasonable people rooting for injuries.